A Fast and Secure Method to Preserve Anonymity in Electronic Voting

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Abstract Mix network plays a key role in electronic voting to preserve anonymity and lots of mixnet schemes have been proposed so far. However, they requires complex and costly zero-knowledge proofs to provide their correct mixing operations. In 2010, Sebé et al. proposed an efficient and lightweight mixnet scheme based on a cryptographic secure hash function instead of zero-knowledge proofs. In this paper, we present a more efficient and faster mixnet scheme than Sebé et al.’s scheme under the same assumption. Also, our scheme is secure.

Key Words: Zero-knowledge proof, e-Voting, Anonymity, Mixnet, hash function

1. Introduction

Mixes are a means of untraceable communication based on a public key cryptosystem, as published by D.Chaum in 1981[1]. A mix-network or mixnet accepts as input a collection of ciphertexts, and outputs associated plaintexts(or ciphertexts) in a randomly permuted order. A well constructed mixnet makes it infeasible for an adversary to determine which plaintext output corresponds to which ciphertext input more efficiently than by guessing at random. Proposed by D.Chaum in 1981 as a technique for anonymous e-mail and e-voting, mixnet can be categorized into decryption mix-nets and re-encryption mix-nets[2, 3]. A mixnet consists of a sequence of servers, mixes. Each server receives a batch of input messages and produces as output the batch in permuted(mixed) order[1,4]. In e-voting, after [1], lots of e-voting schemes based on mixnet have been proposed so far, and they are called Mix-type voting schemes[4,6,7].

Mix networks are often called mix cascades or shuffle networks. In e-voting, encrypted votes are inputted to the mix network as an input batch. An observer should not be able to match the outputs with
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corresponding inputs; this property provides anonymity (voter privacy) in an e-voting. To provide this property, each mix server should also output a proof that it has operated correctly. Otherwise, a dishonest server could replace a ballot with another one or simply do not shuffle at all without anybody noticing.

In [6], they stated that a robust mix network should:

- operate correctly: the output should correspond to a permutation of the input,
- provide privacy: an observer should not be able to determine which input element corresponds to a given output element (and vice versa) in any way better than guessing, and
- be robust: provide a proof or at least strong evidence that it has operated correctly. In addition, it is beneficial if any interested party is able to check the proof or evaluate the evidence: a property called public verifiability.

Though a mix-net is based on a public cryptosystem, for e.g., ElGamal cryptosystem, direct implementation using RSA without composition with other functions (for e.g., destroying the multiplicative structure), can be broken by an active attack which is perfectly feasible in a typical mix-environment[8,9].

The mixing of encrypted votes should be done verifiably; i.e., there must exist some method to prove that no manipulation, such as vote replacement has taken place during this procedure. This verification method has to accomplish two main properties:

- A dishonest mixer will be caught with high probability even if a single plaintext message gets modified.
- It does not break unlinkability.

In 2010, Sebé et al. proposed an efficient and simple mixnet scheme based on cryptographic hash function[14]. They pointed out that current mixing verification processes make use of complex zero-knowledge proofs, and thus the cost of such schemes becomes especially unaffordable when several mix servers compose the mixnet.

In this paper, we present more efficient and fast mixnet scheme than Sebé et al.’s scheme under the same assumption. This paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews related works, ElGamal cryptosystem, and Sebé et al.’s mixnet scheme. In Section III, we propose an improved mixnet scheme and analyze the security and efficiency of the scheme. Finally, Section IV concludes the paper.

II. Related works

1. Elgamal cryptosystem

The ElGamal cryptosystem is based on discrete logarithms. Let $p$ be a large prime and $g$ be a generator of $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$, both public parameters and $p$ must be chosen such that $p - 1$ has at least one large prime factor $q$, i.e. $(p - 1)|q$. Suppose $A$ wants to send a message $m$ to $B$, then $B$ selects its private key $x$ and computes $y = g^x (\text{mod } p)$, and then publishes $g, y, p$. $A$ computes $(c, d) = (g^r, y^rm)$ where $r$ is a random number, and sends $(c, d)$ to $B$. $B$ can decrypt $(c, d)$ by computing $dc^{-x} = y^rng^{-rx} (\text{mod } p)$ yielding $m$.

ElGamal cryptosystem has two important properties, homomorphic and remasking (reencryption) properties. Homomorphic property means that decryption of production of two ciphertexts produces production of two plaintexts, i.e., multiplicative homomorphic property[10,11]. The other property, reencryption means that, given a ciphertext $(c, d)$, one can reencrypt it by computing $(c', d') = (cg', dy')$ where $r'$ is a random number.
2. Verifiable decryption of an Elgamal ciphertext

Given a tuple \((g, u, y, v)\), \(P\) can prove in zero-knowledge that, she knows a secret satisfying \(y = g^x\) and \(u = v\) using one-way hash function \(h(\cdot)\) as follows:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad P \text{ chooses a random number } s \text{ and computes } (a, b) = (g^s, u^s). \\
\text{b.} & \quad P \text{ computes } w = h(a | b) \text{ and } r = s + wx, \\
\text{c.} & \quad V \text{ computes } w = h(a | b). \text{ and checks } g^r = ay^r \text{ and } u^r = bv^r \text{ hold.}
\end{align*}\]

Given an ElGamal ciphertext \((c, d) = (g^r, y^r m)\) where \(y = g^x \pmod p\) and \(x\) is the server's private key, the server can prove \(m\) is the plaintext without revealing \(x\) by publishing proof of \((g, c, y,\frac{d}{m})\). We will denote \(CP(g, u, y, v)\) (Chaum-Pederson’s proof) the tuple \((a, b, r)\) sent by the prover to the verifier.

3. Sebe et al.’s mixnet

In this section, we briefly review Sebé et al.’s mixing scheme.

(1) Notations

The notations used in this paper are as follows:

- \(TP\): trusted party.
- \(x\): \(TP\)'s private key.
- \(y\): \(TP\)'s public key \((y = g^x)\).
- \(\lambda\): the number of mix servers.
- \(ME_i\): the \(i^{th}\) mix server \((1 \leq i \leq \lambda)\).
- \(n\): the number of encrypted votes.
- \(P_j\): the \(j^{th}\) voter.
- \(C_j\): the \(j^{th}\) encrypted vote.
- \((C_j = (c_j, d_j), 1 \leq j \leq n)\)
- \(h(\cdot)\): a cryptographic secure hash function.
- \(\pi\): a permutation function.

(2) Setup

\(TP\) selects its private key \(x\) and computes \(y = g^x \pmod p\). \(TP\) also selects \(x E\) and computes \(QE = x EP\) where \(P\) is a point of an elliptic curve \(E\) for e.g., [16, 17]. \(TP\) publishes \(g, y, p, QE, \text{ and } P\).

(3) Voting

\(P_i\) selects her vote \(v_i\), and encrypts it using public key \(QE\), yielding \(V_i = E_{O_i}(v_i)\). And then she computes \(h_i = h(v_i)\) and prepares her message \(m_i = V_i || h_i || b_i\), where \(b_i\) is chosen so that \(m_i\) is a quadratic residue of \(Z_p^\ast\).

Next, \(P_i\) encrypts \(m_i\) using public key \(y\), obtaining the ciphertext \((c_i, d_i)\) and publishes it with its digital signature \(\sigma_{P_i}(C_i)\) to the bulletin board. All participants can check the validity of this digital signature.

(4) Vote mixing

After the poll is closed, \(TP\) performs the following steps.

\[\begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad TP \text{ computes } C_c = \prod_{j=1}^{n} C_j = \left(\prod_{j=1}^{n} c_j\right) \left(\prod_{j=1}^{n} d_j\right) \\
\text{b.} & \quad \text{The first mix server } ME_1 \text{ generates } s \text{ ElGamal ciphertexts of randomly chosen dummy message } \left(m_{1,1}, \cdots, m_{1,s}\right). \text{ Note that there are } n + s \text{ ciphertexts.} \\
\text{c.} & \quad ME_1 \text{ publishes } \tilde{H}_1 = h(m_{1,1}), \cdots, h(m_{1,s}). \\
\text{d.} & \quad ME_1 \text{ reencrypts and permutes } C_j^{1 \leq i \leq n + s}, \text{ by computing } C'_j = (c'_j, d'_j) = (c_{j,\pi(j)} g_{j,\pi(j)}^{r'_j} d_{j,\pi(j)} y_{\pi(j)}), \text{ where } r'_j \text{ is a random number and } \pi \text{ is a random permutation, and publishes } C'_j^{1 \leq j \leq n + s} \text{ to the bulletin board.}
\end{align*}\]
e. $ME_1$ outputs $C'_j \mid 1 \leq j \leq n + s$ to the next mix server.

f. For $2 \leq i \leq \lambda$, the $i^{th}$ mix server takes its input ciphertexts from the $(i-1)^{th}$ mix server, and performs the same operations.

g. At last, the last mix server publishes $\hat{H_j}$ and $C'_j \mid 1 \leq j \leq n + s\lambda$ to the bulletin board.

(5) Vote opening
After all mix servers finish their mixing, $TP$ executes the following operations.

a. $TP$ decrypts each ciphertext $C'_j = (c'_j, d'_j)$ with its private key $x$, and publishes the set $\hat{m}_j \mid 1 \leq j \leq n + s\lambda$ on the bulletin board.

b. $TP$ removes $\hat{m}_j$ from the set of decrypted messages satisfying $h(\hat{m}_j) \in \hat{H}$ where $1 \leq i \leq \lambda$. Note that this operation removes exactly $s\lambda$ messages.

c. $TP$ decrypts $Cc = (c_c, d_c)$ and publishes $m_c$ with its proof of correct decryption $CP(g, C_c, y, \frac{d_c}{m_c})$.

After this is done, all participants check:

- The correctness of $m_c$
- Check whether $m_c = \prod_{j=1}^{n} m_j$ holds or not.
- Check whether $h_i = h(V_i)$ holds or not using $m_j = V_j \| h_j \| b_j$.

If these checks are satisfied, $TP$ decrypts $V_j = E_{Q_h}(w_j)$ and publishes its plaintext $w_j$ with the corresponding proof of correct decryption.

(6) Security and efficiency
Sebé et al. claimed that their mixnet scheme is secure as long as at least one mix server honest, the overall permutation will not be known, and thus it satisfies anonymity. However, their scheme requires $n + s\lambda$ hash operations and $(n + s\lambda)s\lambda$ comparisons at most, and additional $2s \sum_{i=1}^{i} d$ en/decryptions for dummies.

III. Improved mixing scheme
In this section, we present an improved mixnet scheme.

1. Vote mixing
At first, The $TP$ computes and publishes

\[ C_c = (c_c, d_c) = \prod_{j=1}^{n} c_j = (\prod_{j=1}^{n} d_j, \prod_{j=1}^{n} d_j) \]

Suppose that there are $\lambda$ mix servers, then the first mix server $ME_1$ performs the following operations.

a. $ME_1$ takes $C_j \mid 1 \leq j \leq n$ as input batch, and computes a new list of permuted and reencrypted ciphertexts as

\[ C'_j = (c'_j, d'_j) = (c_{x(i)}, g^{r'_j}, d_{x(i)} \cdot y^{r'_j}) \]

where $1 \leq j \leq n$ and each $r'_j$ is a random number.

b. $ME_1$ selects a random number $k_1 (1 \leq k_1 \leq n)$ and removes $C'_1 = C_{k_1}$ from the list and computes $H_1 = h(C_{k_1})$

c. $ME_1$ sends two lists $C$ and $C'_1 \mid 1 \leq j \leq n - 1$ to the next mix server and publishes $H_1$ to the public bulletin board.
d. The $i^{th}$ mix server $ME_i$ takes two input lists \( \{C_1, \ldots, C_{i-1}\} \) and \( C'_j \; 1 \leq j \leq n-i+1 \) as input batch, and computes a new lists of permuted and reencrypted ciphertexts as
\[
C'_j = (c'_j, d'_j) = (c_{e(i)} \cdot g^{r_j}, d_{e(i)} \cdot y^{r_j})
\]
where \( 1 \leq j \leq n-i+1 \) and each \( r'_j \) is a random number.

e. $ME_i$ picks a random number \( k_i \; (1 \leq k_i \leq n-i+1) \) and removes \( C'_i \) from the new list and computes \( H_i = h(C'_i) \).

f. $ME_i$ computes another list of permuted and reencrypted ciphertexts including \( \overline{C} \) as
\[
\overline{C}'_j = (\overline{c}'_j, \overline{d}'_j) = (c_{e(i)} \cdot g^{r''_j}, d_{e(i)} \cdot y^{r''_j})
\]
where \( 1 \leq j \leq i \) and each \( r''_j \) is a random number.

g. $ME_i$ publishes $H$ to the bulletin board and sends two lists \( \{\overline{C}_1', \ldots, \overline{C}_i'\} \) and \( C'_j \; 1 \leq j \leq n-i \) to the \((i+1)^{th}\) mix server.

h. Finally, the last mix server $ME_\lambda$ outputs \( \{\overline{C}_1', \ldots, \overline{C}_\lambda'\} \) and \( C'_j \; 1 \leq j \leq n-\lambda \) and publishes the lists to the bulletin board, and at the end, the bulletin board will contain \( H_1, \ldots, H_\lambda \) and two lists of ciphertexts \( \{\overline{C}_1', \ldots, \overline{C}_\lambda'\} \) and \( C'_j \; 1 \leq j \leq n-\lambda \).

2. Vote opening
At the vote opening phase, $TP$ and mix servers perform:

a. Each $ME_1$ publishes its ciphertext \( \overline{C} \) and all participants verify \( H_i = h(\overline{C}_i) \).

b. $TP$ computes
\[
\overline{C} = \prod_{i=1}^{\lambda} \overline{c}_i \prod_{i=1}^{\lambda} \overline{d}_i
\]
and decrypts \( \overline{C} \) and \( \overline{C}' \) with those proofs of correct decryptions yielding \( \overline{m} \) and \( \overline{m}' \) respectively. All participants verify the proofs of correct decryptions and check \( \overline{m} = \overline{m}' \).

c. $TP$ computes
\[
C'_c = (c'_c, d'_c) = \prod_{j=1}^{n-\lambda} C'_j \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{\lambda} \overline{C}_j
\]
and obtains \( m'_c \) by decrypting \( C'_c \) and publishes \( m'_c \) with its proof of decryption \( CP(g, c'_c, y, d'_c, m'_c) \).

de. $TP$ decrypts \( C_c \) using its private key \( x \) and publishes \( m_c \) with its proof of correct decryption \( CP(g, c_c, y, d_c, m_c) \).

e. $TP$ publishes \( \overline{m}_1', \ldots, \overline{m}_\lambda' \) and \( m_j \; (1 \leq j \leq n-\lambda) \) by decrypting \( \{\overline{C}_1', \ldots, \overline{C}_\lambda'\} \) and \( C'_j \; 1 \leq j \leq n-\lambda \).

After these steps are done, all parties can check:

- The correctness of \( m_c \)
- Check whether \( m_c = \prod_{j=1}^{\lambda} \overline{m}_j' \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{n-\lambda} m_j' \)
      holds or not.

If these checks are satisfied, $TP$ decrypts \( V_j' = E_{Q_e}(v_j') \; (1 \leq j \leq n-\lambda) \) and \( \overline{V_j}' = E_{Q_e}(\overline{v}_j') \; (1 \leq j \leq \lambda) \), and publishes its plaintext \( v_j' \) and \( \overline{v}_j' \) with the corresponding proof of correct decryption.
3. Security and efficiency

As long as at least one mix server is honest, then the overall permutation will not be known and the probability of not detecting that a honest mix server has been bypassed is $n^{-1}$ because the honest server selects one ciphertext randomly among $n$ ciphertexts.

Table 1. Comparison results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>Sebé’s scheme</th>
<th>Our proposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permutation</td>
<td>$\lambda$</td>
<td>$\lambda$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hash</td>
<td>$n + 2s\lambda$</td>
<td>$\lambda$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>$(n + s\lambda)s\lambda$</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En/Decryptions</td>
<td>$2s \sum_{i=1}^{\lambda} i$</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>$\left(\frac{s}{n}\right)^{\lambda}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{n}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* : For dummies.

The proposed mixnet scheme is more efficient than Sebé et al.’s scheme because the proposed scheme requires fewer hash operations and no comparisons at all. Comparison results are shown in Table 1.

IV. Conclusion

In this paper, an efficient and simple mixnet scheme has been proposed. It requires fewer hash operations and no comparison operations at all, and thus is more efficient than Sebé et al.’s mixnet scheme under the same assumptions.

References

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<주관심분야 : 정보보안, 네트워크 보안, DRM>